Minilateral Arrangements and Their Legal Form: Between Treaty and Understanding
Publication trail
- Received19 January 2026
- Revised30 March 2026
- Accepted21 May 2026
- Published15 July 2026
Review took 122 days from receipt to acceptance
Abstract
This paper examines the legal form of the minilateral regional arrangements that have proliferated over the last decade, and asks whether the absence of treaty form weakens their binding character or grants them deliberate flexibility. Analysing twelve existing arrangements by their commitment mechanism and exit cost, it concludes that flexibility is bought at a price that appears at the first serious dispute.
Keywords
- Minilateralism
- International Law
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Author declarations
- Author contributions
- The sole author is responsible for the entire work: design, analysis and writing.
- Funding
- This study received no funding from any party.
- Conflict of interest
- The author declares no conflict of interest.
- Data availability
- All analysed documents are public and listed in the references.
References
- Al-Fahad, O. (2025). Regional balances of power and alliance management. Journal of Strategic Studies, 18(2), 44–71.
How to cite this article
APA style
Barri, S. (2026). Minilateral Arrangements and Their Legal Form: Between Treaty and Understanding. Eissa Journal of Strategic Studies, 1(2), 39–66. https://doi.org/10.5281/eissl.journal.2026.0022
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