Sanctions Compliance in Regional Banking: The Cost of Over-Caution
Publication trail
- Received2 March 2026
- RevisedNo revision requested
- Accepted30 May 2026
- Published15 July 2026
Review took 89 days from receipt to acceptance
Abstract
A policy paper addressing de-risking in regional banks, where caution over sanctions severs legitimate correspondent relationships. It estimates the cost of that withdrawal for small trade finance and proposes a framework for distinguishing real from perceived risk.
Keywords
- Compliance
- Trade Finance
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Author declarations
- Author contributions
- The sole author is responsible for the entire work.
- Funding
- This study received no funding from any party.
- Conflict of interest
- The author declares no conflict of interest.
- Data availability
- The paper draws on published data from the relevant central banks.
References
- Murshid, L. (2026). Regulation before the platform. Journal of Public Policy, 11(1), 9–33.
How to cite this article
APA style
Hamdan, T. (2026). Sanctions Compliance in Regional Banking: The Cost of Over-Caution. Eissa Journal of Strategic Studies, 1(2), 67–84. https://doi.org/10.5281/eissl.journal.2026.0023
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