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Eissa Institute for Strategic Studies and LeadershipEissa Institute for Strategic Studies and Leadership
Eissa Institute for Strategic Studies and LeadershipEissa Institute for Strategic Studies and Leadership

Regional Alliances After Unipolarity: Conditions of Durability

What makes a regional alliance hold when great-power balances change?

Abstract

This study asks what makes regional alliances durable in a distributed-power order, examining six existing arrangements by their dispute-resolution mechanisms and exit costs. It finds that alliances built on interlocking economic interests outlast those built on a shared threat alone.

Keywords

  • Alliances
  • Balance of Power

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References

  1. Al-Qahtani, S. (2026). Arab strategic autonomy. EISSL.
  2. Al-Otaibi, H. (2025). Exit costs in regional arrangements. Institute Policy Papers, 6, 5–31.

Citation

APA style

Omar Al-Fahad. (2026). Regional Alliances After Unipolarity: Conditions of Durability. EISSL.